Trial Docket Number: #24-CM-0054 Presiding Trial Judge: Associate Justice Antonio McFornell Notice of Appeal Filed:
[ ] Before Verdict
[X] After Verdict
Reason for Notice of Appeal:
[ ] Motion to be overturned
[ ] Errors in the trials procedure
[X] Errors in the judge's interpretation of the law
[ ] New evidence proving appellants innocence
Grounds for Appeal:(Maximum 150 words)
The Prosecution provided evidence confirming the defendant's speed, "Was conducting a speed trap where I clocked Roberto going 192 km/h. [...] he went over 2,5 times the speed limit through a crowded area of the city. This is no longer considered negligent or covered by the 3rd degree speeding. He was going 112 km/h OVER the speed limit. "
The difference between a discretionary 3rd degree speeding citation and a reckless operation charge is 1 km/hr, by definition, as there is no 4th degree speeding citation for speeds in excess of 80 km/hr. Law enforcement officers have the right to use this discretion in their duties, and as such the choice of going with a speeding citation or a misdemeanor charge of reckless operation would be the choice of the officer for a speed of exactly 80 km/h over the posted speed limit. However, this is a case where the Defendant was undoubtedly going somewhere between 80 and 177 km/h over the posted speed limit, based on the evidence presented and statements made.
The Prosecution presented the arrest report as its main piece of evidence as is the procedure for bench trials. The facts stated in the report and arguments presented during the trial establishes there should be no doubt in considering the defendant's driving as reckless.
Last edited by Terence Williams on 16 Jan 2025, 11:52, edited 1 time in total.
San Andreas Judicial Branch San Andreas Court of Appeals "EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW"
NOTICE OF ACTIVATION
IN THE SAN ANDREAS COURT OF APPEALS
State of San Andreas v. Roberto Sanchez
#25-AP-0001
A Notice of Activation was entered in the above appeal on the 16th day of January, 2025.
The case of State of San Andreas v. Roberto Sanchez is hereby activated by this Court under #25-AP-0001.
Initially the court will be waiting for both parties to obtain representation. At that point the appealing party will be ordered to submit an initial written brief within the next seven days outlining their position of this appeal and giving any legal arguments as to why the court should rule to overturn a previous verdict. Once the initial brief has been recorded by the courts, the opposing counsel will be given an additional 7 days to respond. The initiating party will be given one final response, which the courts will allow 3 days to produce. The court may allow either party an additional response at the justices discretion. Once the briefs have been submitted the court will determine a verdict.
Please note that this appeal may be getting activated out of order. This exception is being made due to conflicts of interest that I possess on other appeals.
So ordered, Superior Court Justice
Branch Administrator
San Andreas Judicial Branch
505-9925 — [email protected]
San Andreas Judicial Branch San Andreas Court of Appeals "EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW"
NOTIFICATION OF COUNSEL
IN THE SAN ANDREAS COURT OF APPEALS
State of San Andreas v. Roberto Sanchez
A Notification of Counsel was filed in the above case on 18/Jan/2025.
I, Hugh R. Allgood, a Defense Attorney with the San Andreas Judicial Branch, will be representing the defendant, Roberto Sanchez, in the underlying case.
I will be taking the responsibility of Primary Counsel and will await further instruction from the Presiding Judge.
Court Clerk / Public Defender
San Andreas Judicial Branch
(909) 235-6076 — [email protected]
San Andreas Judicial Branch Docket Notice "HERE FOR YOU | SAFE FOR YOU"
Prosecution and defense counsel,
The appealing party is hereby ordered to submit an initial written brief within the next seven days outlining their position of this appeal and giving any legal arguments as to why the court should rule to overturn a previous verdict. Once the initial brief has been recorded by the courts, the opposing counsel will be given an additional 7 days to respond. The initiating party will be given one final response, which the courts will allow 3 days to produce. The court may allow either party an additional response at the justices discretion. Once the briefs have been submitted the court will determine a verdict.
Respectfully, Superior Court Justice
Branch Administrator
San Andreas Judicial Branch
505-9925 — [email protected]
San Andreas Judicial Branch San Andreas Court of Appeals "EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW"
Honorable Judge Kant,
The Prosecution is filing this brief to appeal a verdict issued by former Judge McFornell, in which they labeled the search of a vehicle unlawful due to ruling that the defendant in the case had not been driving recklessly, as was argued by the Prosecution and law enforcement.
In the original case, the Prosecution presented an arrest report and a witness statement as evidence against the defendant. The arrest report documented eyewitness testimony from the arresting officer who had set up a speed trap and clocked the defendant driving past them in their vehicle at 192kmph, 250% of the permitted speed inside city limits. The vehicle was stopped and searched following the defendant's arrest, with an unregistered and modified class 1 firearm found inside the vehicle. The Prosecution argued that the defendant's driving was a clear violation of VM03 due to the extreme speeds of driving within city limits and other dangers such driving imposed on the general traffic in the area, such as fatal injuries should a crash have happened at such speeds and failing to yield for other motorists. The defendant and the Defense argued that the defendant had not been reckless when driving at the recorded speeds and claimed that "[...]apart from the excessive speed, he had been in control of the vehicle, yielding at intersections and maintaining his lane."
In their verdict, Judge McFornell stated that "[...] the Court can't conclude that a reasonable risk was created through the actions of the defendant in the alleged reckless operation of a vehicle, particularly given that the defendant had the right of way and was not required to yield at the specific intersections that they drove through, and thus, making the prosecution's primary argument for the charge to fall apart." Additionally, the judge went on to state that "The Court emphasizes that the defendant clarified that they drove from Burgershot to the Parking Garage nearby, specifically, two blocks apart. This situation was undisputed, and thus allowed the Court to conclude that the defendant had been driving eastbound through two blocks, circumstance in which he had the right of way and was not required to yield -albeit driving in excessive speeds-." The judge also incorrectly stated that the Prosecution's primary argument for the vehicle misdemeanor against the defendant was "[...]based, primarily, on the defendant’s failure to yield or stop at intersections."
Judge McFornell's verdict contains errors based on multiple issues. The first issue concerns the distance. The only parking garage facing San Andreas Avenue is the red parking garage opposite the 'Daily Globe International' building next to the La Puerta Freeway overpass. This parking garage is not two blocks away, but five (5), over 900 meters from Burgershot. There are no parking garages two blocks away from Burgershot, as that location would be at the park between Decker Street and Vespucci Boulevard/South Rockford Drive. The only other parking structure facing San Andreas Avenue is at the Los Santos Mall, which is still four (4) blocks and over 800 meters from Burgershot. To get to this parking garage, the defendant would have gone through seven (7) signaled intersections.
The second issue regards the requirement to yield. The penal code's vehicle citation of VC05 - Improper Traffic Maneuvers, which incorporates the previous citation of VC08 - Failure To Yield, defines yielding as "slowing down before a traffic control device and making sure that the intersection is clear. The first vehicle at an intersection has right of way." It is clear from this definition that no matter where or how you are driving, you are always required to yield before entering an intersection, not in the middle of the intersection, not after it. Right of way is not established based on driving on a main traffic corridor, it is clearly defined as being the primary vehicle entering any intersection, and as the Prosecution argued during the original case, it is physically impossible to slow down sufficiently to be able to yield to other traffic and driving at the recorded speed as the defendant was at the same time. However, the judge wilfully ignored the law as cited by the Prosecution, instead ruling that the defendant had no requirement to yield.
The third issue concerns speed. Eye witness testimony states that the defendant was driving at 192kmph on a road where traffic is usually limited to 80kmph. That is an excess of 112kmph above the legal limit. The penal code allows for three types of speeding citations, the most severe being VC03 - Speeding 3rd Degree, which pertains to speeding between 41 and 80kmph above the respective speed limit on public roads. This citation would have been issued if the defendant had been driving upwards up 160kmph. However, they were exceeding even that limit by over 30kmph. In a verdict for #23-CM-0086, State of San Andreas v. Bongo Haze, former judge Hugh Allgood established law enforcement's discretion between issuing a citation for 3rd degree speeding and a misdemeanor for reckless operation, due to the non-existence of a citation for 4th degree speeding. In both cases, the evidence was explicitly showing that each defendant in their respective case had exceeded the limit of the speeding citation significantly, with both arrests resulting in a misdemeanor charge for reckless driving. In this instance the defendant was driving more than 30kmph above the highest limit for a speeding citation, with clear precedent establishing the arresting officer's discretion to charge the defendant with VM03 for their driving, whatever the defendant's explanation for driving the way they did.
To summarize the facts of this case: the defendant was clocked driving at 192kmph on a busy traffic corridor where only 80kmph speeds were allowed; logic dictates that any reasonable yielding will have been impossible at such speeds; the defendant will have gone through several intersections before being pulled over, each crossing posing a significant risk to limbs and life of the defendant and other motorists due to the extreme speeds and subsequent failure to yield; the defendant is required by law to yield before entering an intersection, which is impossible at the recorded speed. These were all facts presented at trial by the Prosecution, however, the judge decided to rule against facts in favor of the defendant, ruling against the law as established in the penal code and against previous case precedent, essentially ruling that the defendant had the right to drive however they wished at the expense of other motorists. It is with the considerations and facts above that the Prosecution requests that the Court of Appeals overturn Judge McFornell's verdict and reinstate all charges against the defendant, including any charges that came as a result of the defendant's arrest for reckless driving.
Regards, Terence Williams
Attorney General
San Andreas Judicial Branch
234-9321 — [email protected]
Last edited by Terence Williams on 05 Feb 2025, 21:49, edited 2 times in total.
San Andreas Judicial Branch San Andreas Court of Appeals "EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW"
RESPONDENT RESPONSE
To all interested parties,
The Respondent wishes to express our gratitude to the Court of Appeals for hearing this matter and giving the Respondent an opportunity to make its arguments pertaining to our position.
The Appellant has filed this appeal claiming the presiding Judge in the Superior Court of San Andreas committed an error in their interpretation of the law, namely, claiming that because testimony and evidence presented was that the Respondent was traveling 112 Km/H over the posted 80 Km/H speed limit the Respondent was guilty of Reckless Operation of a Road or Marine Vehicle. The Appellant also cited "precedence" under #23-CM-0086, State of San Andreas v. Bongo Haze, which interestingly enough is a verdict this Counsel authored during a previous stint in the State Judiciary.
The Respondent, through Counsel, argues the Court of Appeals should rule in favor of the Respondent on several grounds; (1) double jeopardy protected afforded to the Respondent and (2) the Judge did not err in their interpretation of the law and further that (3) even if the Respondent were to be arrested for a criminal charge, the search incident to arrest was misapplied and unlawful.
Double Jeopardy Protection
The 5th Amendment to the San Andreas Constitution states,
No person shall be subject to prosecution of the same offense twice, constituting double jeopardy, and put in jeopardy of life or limb.
The Respondent has already been prosecuted for the offenses heard by the Superior Court of San Andreas, and was indeed put in jeopardy of life or limb at that time as he was arrested and served time in a correctional facility. The Respondent had their case heard at trial and was acquitted of the charges. To reverse the Superior Court's decision would subject the Respondent to the same prosecution and subject him to his life (through liberty and security). In fact, Court of Appeals guidelines expressly state, "typically the only persons able to file an appeal after an issuance of verdict is the defendant or their attorney(s) due to the Double Jeopardy rule. " in recognition for the harms faced by overturning an acquittal, which is supposed to be final.
Unfortunately, the Office of the Attorney General regularly files appeals of cases wherein an acquittal was granted to a Defendant (most of the cases filed at the Court of Appeals are prosecution-initiated), which is tragic as Defendants filing appeals at the Superior Court of Appeals essentially risk being prosecuted a third time (through this Court) if they are acquitted. As this is regular practice, there is fortunately precedence established by this Court on how these cases are to be followed. The cases are very conveniently in succession; 23-AP-0009, 23-AP-0010, and 23-AP-0011.
23-AP-0009
To finally address the issue of double jeopardy as raised by the respondent in this case, the court must respect the binding authority of the Constitution and will be ruling in accordance with the language set forth within the 5th Amendment that no person shall be subject to prosecution of the same offense twice, constituting double jeopardy, and put in jeopardy of life or limb. To be clear, there are few circumstances in which the court would grant an appeal submitted by the prosecution after a finding of a not guilty verdict. These types of situations must present a significant legal error that had a direct impact on the fairness of the case. Should such an error exist, the court may, simply put, set aside the not guilty verdict rendered in the Superior Court and order a remedy to mitigate the error, effectively causing the original case to remain open for the defendant's right to a fair trial to be observed.
23-AP-0010
The court also acknowledges that a overturning the presiding Judges verdict and sending it back to the Superior Court would breach the defendants constitutional rights to double jeopardy, therefore, the court will not be doing so. Instead the court will be making ruling of precedent only on how all cases involving a Motion for Summary Judgement will be handled moving forward.
23-AP-0011
As it was stated in the initial filing, and as it has been accepted by this court previously, the intent behind this appeal is to question the application of the law -in other words, legal error- by the presiding judge, and not challenge procedural matters or breach the double jeopardy rule.
In precedence, the Court has clearly stated that any prosecution case heard here in the Court of Appeals can only be a ruling of how cases involving a specific topic would be handled going forward. And as we will argue below, the Court must be careful in this regard and not "legislate through the judiciary". While 23-AP-0009 suggested, in the event of "significant legal error", this Court could vacate a not guilty verdict to allow a case to remain open, we strongly reject this argument -- setting aside a not guilty verdict to allow a case to remain open is most directly subjecting a Defendant to another prosecution.
Therefore, we believe this appeal should be denied on grounds of the harm it would cause to the Respondent through double jeopardy. And as the Appellant is asking the Court to establish precedence, which would aim to have binding implications on any further cases, we believe the appeal should be ruled in favor of the Respondent as the Appellant is asking the Court to legislate which is not within its purview. The Appellant should, rather, spend their time and energy petitioning the Law Review Committee (LRC) to do the legislating and revise existing codes to provide clear guidance to law enforcement through the penal code.
No error was committed
In agreement with the verdict rendered in this case, speeding in of itself is not reckless. The Appellant asks this Court to 'draw a line in the sand' and rule that traveling 112 Km/H over the posted speed limit is VM03 - Reckless Operation of a Road or Marine Vehicle. VM03 defines a violation of this code as, "Intentional disregard for life and/or property through the operation of a road or marine vehicle." No where in this penal code does it define that a speed in excess of 'x' Km/H over is a violation of that code. Therefore, it is the burden of law enforcement, and in this instance the Appellant, to articulate an "intentional disregard for life and/or property through the operation of a road or marine vehicle" occurred.
Even the Appellant's own witness suggested the Defendant could have been charged with a myriad of other offenses, to include VC08 - Negligent Operation of a Road or Marine Vehicle OR VM03 - Reckless Operation of a Road or Marine Vehicle. The difference between these two offenses is "reasonable care given" or "intentional disregard". So the question is asked, could the Respondent's speed have caused personal injuries or damages? Sure. But, that's a reasonable care standard for which the Respondent should have been cited under VC08 and not arrested nor their vehicle searched. To charge someone with the more serious charge of VM03, the legal standard has to involve a showing of "intentional disregard". To intentionally disregard something requires a showing of intent to do so. That's not been shown nor proven by the Appellant here. The Appellant themselves seems to give support to this by claiming, "extreme speeds of driving within city limits and other dangers such driving imposed on the general traffic in the area, such as fatal injuries should a crash have happened at such speeds and failing to yield for other motorists". This "should a crash have happened" suggests the Respondent failed to provide reasonable care in their driving, not that they were intentionally disregarding life and/or property.
The Appellant goes on to argue with the facts as the judge understood it. However, this is not appropriate in an appeal; this is not a re-trial of facts, and encroaches again on the Respondent's right to be free from double jeopardy. The Appellant should have argued these facts at trial, but it appears these facts were not presented nor argued.
To discuss 'precedence' set in the verdict that this Counsel authored, the current case under appeal is substantially different than the case it cites -- and the Appellant is misinterpreting and stretching the conclusion drawn there and attempting to apply it here.
In the cited case, the Court (I) stated, "The difference between a discretionary (emphasis added) 3rd degree speeding citation and a reckless operation charge is 1 km/hr, by definition, as there is no 4th degree speeding citation for speeds in excess of 80 km/hr." This statement only applies if a person was traveling exactly 80 Km/H over the speed limit, as law enforcement would have the option of citing someone for 3rd degree speeding or reckless operation, at that speed, because the facts could support either charge. However, the Court (this Counsel) goes on to state, " this is a case where the Defendant was undoubtedly going somewhere between 80 and 177 km/h". The Court (I) mean that a speed in excess of 80 Km/H would no longer apply for a speeding citation, and therefore, an Officer would not be able to issue a speeding citation for that speed -- but that does not mean they are forced to stick someone with VM03. Also found in that decision was the actual binding authority of the precedence set, "Any cases in the future that come in front of the Superior Court should reviewed in light of the conclusions made within this decision". Therefore, what happened in this present case is precisely what this means, any lower courts should consider the facts of the present case and apply the law considering the conclusions drawn in that case. But in no way shape or form did the Court (this Counsel) set precedence of x Km/H over the speed limit was automatically Reckless Operation vs. speeding or some other offense.
To further highlight where this case and the cited case differ, it's important to see where the two cases differ;
In the case cited as precedence, the Defense agreed the Defendant's driving was reckless. However, in the case for appeal, this is not the case and in-fact the Defendant contested their driving was reckless in their original submission stating, "the level at which the officer claims I was speeding I contest - but to say my driving was reckless is an outright lie and false justification for an arrest". Even under the current case on appeal, the Appellant attempted to make appropriate arguments of additional factors (e.g. the Respondent allegedly failing to stop at intersections) that if proven true would support a Reckless Operation charge. However, this claim was contested and not proven through evidence, and the Judge recognized this in the verdict and ruled accordingly. As stated above, the arguments the Appellant now makes to support further factors suggestive of reckless versus some other charge, should have been made there and not here -- the appellate Court is not a trial de novo.
The Appellant attempts to invoke emotion of this Court by stating the trial judge "essentially ruling that the defendant had the right to drive however they wished at the expense of other motorists." So dramatic and spicy and this Court should not be swayed by such emotion in making their ruling. What the trial judge actually ruled, and we concur with, is the Prosecution must prove reckless driving. The other applicable charge here is a citation for careless operation. We agree the Respondent's driving was careless and believe the Respondent should have been cited for such and told to slow down. But without more, it's not appropriate to charge someone with a misdemeanor. The State must show more and failed in their burden.
Search incident to arrest misapplied
It's also important to highlight the Court's role in protecting the rights of the citizens in its rulings and this would be the perfect case for this Court to establish binding precedence on searches incident to arrest.
The case on appeal also involved a search of a vehicle under a "search incident to arrest", and evidence unrelated to the arrest being seized and the Respondent being charged for this seizure. As with any governmental action, the actions must be reasonable under the constitution. This extends to the arrest being made to precipitate the search. As argued above, neither law enforcement nor the Courts should not be the "arbitrator" of defining speeding x Km/H over the posted speed limit as one charge over the other. That's reserved for the legislation. Allowing this presents a great risk for abuse as law enforcement could effectively skirt the bounds of the Constitution by using the "exception" to the search warrant requirements to search persons who have been stopped for excessive speeds. This formed a portion of the argument in the case cited by the Appellant as precedence -- the Defendant claimed law enforcement gave them a choice to allow them to search their vehicle in exchange for a citation or force the search by arresting them. This is not appropriate. A search conducted incident to a (lawful) arrest must be only centered around seeking evidence related to that arrest, as the arrest is what permitted the search in the first place. The exception exists to prevent destruction or loss of the evidence that could occur by requiring law enforcement to seek a search warrant to be permitted to search. Therefore, law enforcement should not be stopping and arresting motorists for traffic-related offenses and then searching for evidence of contraband ((real-life case, Arizona v. Gant)).
Therefore, for the arguments made here, we respectfully ask this Court to uphold the ruling made in the Superior Court.
Respectfully,
Court Clerk
San Andreas Judicial Branch
(909) 235-6076 — [email protected]
San Andreas Judicial Branch Superior Court of San Andreas "EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW"
MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE
IN THE SAN ANDREAS COURT OF APPEALS
State of San Andreas v. Roberto Sanchez
#25-AP-0001
A Motion for Continuance was filed in the above case on the 5th of February, 2025.
The State of San Andreas, by and through the undersigned attorney, filed this Motion for Continuance, and the reasoning for request is as follows;
Reasoning: To allow sufficient time for a response.
Detailed Explanation: Attorney General Williams is currently unavailable and out of office until February 7th. To accommodate the standard 72-hour response timeframe following his return, the Prosecution respectfully requests a continuance until February 10th.
Deputy Attorney General
San Andreas Judicial Branch
(909) 552-8150 — [email protected]
San Andreas Judicial Branch San Andreas Court of Appeals "EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW"
Honorable Judge Kant and pertaining parties,
The Prosecution will use its second brief to comment on various points from the Defense's brief, as well as reiterating facts stated in both the initial appeal brief and original case.
Double Jeopardy Protection
It is true that the defendant has a constitutional right to protection against double prosecution for the same offense. It is also true that the Appellate Court has ruled on double jeopardy in multiple cases, as referenced by defense counsel. However, the Prosecution wants to argue that these rulings are based on a misinterpretation of the Constitution and the double jeopardy rule. The Constitution does indeed state, under the 5th Amendment, that " No person shall be subject to prosecution of the same offense twice, constituting double jeopardy, and put in jeopardy of life or limb." This refers to the fact that you cannot be tried for the same offense twice. It is the Prosecution's belief that, when a verdict in favor of a defendant is being appealed, it does not constitute double jeopardy, as the defendant is neither subjected to multiple prosecutions nor are they put in jeopardy of life or limb. Successfully appealing a not-guilty verdict to reinstate a charge on a defendant's record does not put the defendant at risk of facing additional jail time, fines, or court fees. It is purely an administrative change. As such, an appellate review of a sentence does not expose the defendant to the threat of a second prosecution, and the Prosecution's appeal of an erroneous verdict should be heard and granted in full.
No error was committed
Defense counsel is arguing that speeding in itself is not reckless. They are also arguing that the Prosecution wanted a verdict in its favor to set a hard limit of 112kmph above the legal city limit to be considered reckless driving. Neither of those arguments holds any truth to them. The Prosecution presented a multitude of arguments at trial to summarize the defendant's driving as reckless, which was, as stated in the first brief, not just based on speed, but several other factors which were stated several times at trial, and repeated in the first brief. In that regard, the Prosecution agrees with defense counsel that such arguments should be brought up at trial, which is what they were.
Defense counsel's argument that the defendant should only be held to a failure to provide "reasonable care" as opposed to "intentional disregard" lacks merit. While the defendant stated they didn't believe their driving would constitute reckless driving, they also made statements at trial that proved the arguments the Prosecution brought up alongside the argument for speed as grounds for reckless driving, and these are the arguments that the judge wholly ignored in their verdict. The evidence proved the defendant was driving at 192kmph in an 80-zone, with the defendant inadvertently proving, through their own statements, that they would have had no chance to yield or reasonably maintain care of their vehicle. It is unreasonable and implausible to believe that driving in such a manner would require anything less than clear intent when trying to control a vehicle at such speeds. The totality of the variables surrounding the defendant's driving can only constitute a direct, intentional disregard for the rules of the road and the rules of the law.
Search incident to arrest misapplied
Defense counsel is trying to argue that the search of the defendant's vehicle following their arrest was unreasonable and that the "search incident to arrest" exception was misapplied in this situation. However, as has been established in multiple other cases and through years of governmental and law enforcement practice, vehicles are subject to search following an arrest of an occupant within the vehicle, not dependent on the type of charges alleged. The Prosecution argues that it is not unreasonable to have searched the defendant's vehicle in this situation, as it was not just to secure the tool of the crime (the vehicle), but also grounded in the officer's safety. Should someone have gotten access to the vehicle and to the firearm within, untold damage could have been done not just to the arresting officer and to the defendant, but also to any nearby civilians. The search of the vehicle following this arrest was not an abuse of power, but a merit-based search following a valid arrest. ((I have no comments for the IRL case law as it is not applicable per server rules.))
Based on the arguments presented in this first and second brief, the Prosecution requests the Court of Appeals to overturn an erroneous verdict, as was based on a flawed understanding of cumulative evidence and precedent.
Regards, Terence Williams
Attorney General
San Andreas Judicial Branch
234-9321 — [email protected]
San Andreas Judicial Branch Court of Appeals "EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW"
ISSUANCE OF VERDICT
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF SAN ANDREAS
State of San Andreas v. Roberto Sanchez
#25-AP-0001
A decision was reached in the above case on the 6th day of April, 2025.
The court of appeals reviewed the submissions by both parties. Namely the idea that the previous judge misinterpreted the penal code violation VM03 - Reckless Operation of a Road or Marine Vehicle and breached previous precedence cited in #23-CM-0086, State of San Andreas v. Bongo Haze. There have also been arguments made that the appeal itself breaches double jeopardy and that the search incident to arrest was applied.
The Court of Appeals will touch on all arguments presented as we review the case. We would like to begin by reviewing the previous precedence set in #23-CM-0086, State of San Andreas v. Bongo Haze.
Hugh Allgood wrote: ↑13 Oct 2023, 15:39The difference between a discretionary 3rd degree speeding citation and a reckless operation charge is 1 km/hr, by definition, as there is no 4th degree speeding citation for speeds in excess of 80 km/hr. Law enforcement officers have the right to use this discretion in their duties, and as such the choice of going with a speeding citation or a misdemeanor charge of reckless operation would be the choice of the officer for a speed of exactly 80 km/h over the posted speed limit... As noted earlier, and there was concurrence by the defense that the defendant's driving was indeed reckless, the Court concludes no error on the charge of VM03 - reckless operation of a vehicle, and makes the second conclusion in this case -- the arrest was legally justified.
As shown above, the previous (and current) Judge Allgood illustrated the idea of intent and presentation of facts. In the referenced case, #24-CM-0054, the State of San Andreas v. Roberto Sanchez, intent was up for question as the Judge McFornell stated
Antonio McFornell wrote: ↑19 Aug 2024, 04:09"The Court believes that it is undisputed that the defendant was driving above the speed limit, which again is not contested. However, the Court can't conclude that a reasonable risk was created through the actions of the defendant in the alleged reckless operation of a vehicle..."
The Court of Appeals believes it is not about the specific wording used by Judge McFornell on the case, but the idea that the ruling made by the judge is not egregious enough to warrant a full reversal or remanding back to the Superior Court.
The Court of Appeals would like to reference once more back to the precedence set during #23-CM-0086, State of San Andreas v. Bongo Haze. Noted in the case by the assigned judge, both the traffic stop and subsequent arrest of the defendant were reasonable and justified due to the officers discretion. Their discretion references the probable cause necessary for the search incident to arrest as the officer reasonably believed the charge of reckless operation was appropriately applied based on their training, the circumstances at hand, and the word of a superior.
Similar to office discretion, a judge assigned to a case is allowed to use their discretion to interpret the penal code within reason. However these verdicts do not remove the probable cause assigned to officers when conducting a search incident to a arrest. The Court of Appeals believes the officer in the case of #24-CM-0054, the State of San Andreas v. Roberto Sanchez conducted the arrest in good faith based on the previous precedence of #23-CM-0086, State of San Andreas v. Bongo Haze and with probable case, therefore the resulting charges from the evidence gained would be admissible in a court of law.
In legal terms, an officer acts in "good faith" when they perform their duties with honest intent, a reasonable belief in the legality of their actions, and without malice or intent to deceive. The key factors in determining good faith include whether the officer followed proper procedures, relied on official guidance, and had no reason to believe their actions were unlawful. The officer in the case of #24-CM-0054, the State of San Andreas v. Roberto Sanchez clocked the defendant going at excessive speeds during their routine duties; proceeded to engage the defendant with lights and sirens; called for a supervisor upon request by the defendant; had the situation review by a superior; and finally acted on not only their own opinion but also that of their senior officer.
As for the accusation that the prosecution appealing a case breaches the rights of the defendant via double jeopardy, the Court of Appeals will maintain the finding that cases will be heard in the Court of Appeals as long as they are justified and hold merit. We find the hearing of this case has not breached double jeopardy. No new evidence has been introduced and the defendant is not on trial today, instead the findings of previous judge(s) are at the heart of the appeal.
It is with the above considerations that I move to modify the original ruling by the judge.
On the count of VM03 - Reckless Operation of a Road or Marine Vehicle, I find the defendant, Roberto Sanchez, not guilty.
On the count of WM02 - Possession of a Class 1 Firearm, I find the defendant, Roberto Sanchez, guilty.
On the count of WM03 - Criminal Use of Weapon Modifications, guilty.
So ordered, Associate Justice
Branch Administrator
San Andreas Judicial Branch
505-9925 — [email protected]
