Eclipse Government

Appellant Name: State of San Andreas
Appellant Attorney(s): Terence Williams

Trial Docket Number: #25-CM-0015
Presiding Trial Judge: Hugh Allgood
Notice of Appeal Filed:

• [ ] Before Verdict
  [X] After Verdict

Reason for Notice of Appeal:

• [ ] Motion to be overturned
  [ ] Errors in the trial procedure
  [X] Errors in the judge's interpretation of the law
  [ ] New evidence proving appellant's innocence

Grounds for Appeal: (Maximum 150 words)

• In their verdict of WM03 - Criminal Use of Weapon Modifications, Judge Allgood stated "While the penal code definition states these modifications have to be either used in the commission of a crime, not eligible for purchase through a legal retailer, or if these modifications are in a person's possession when charged with another weapon's felony, the Court believes the legislative intent was to cover person(s) who obtain these modifications for use in a crime, not merely stumbling into a weapon with them on it. The Court does agree the modifications were incidentally used in the commission of the crime, but notes the weapon itself was stolen prior to the crime, and these modifications were not applied by the Defendant. The Court believes this to be an extra charge applied, and not one with a separate, distinct showing of criminal acts." By their own admission, Judge Allgood agrees that the defendant was in violation of 2 out of 3 clauses for WM03 to be valid; however, as the modifications were legally bought and applied by the weapon's registered owner, the judge decided that the charge does not apply. This is an outright failure in upholding not just the letter of the law, but also the spirit of the law, where a majority of the charges' clauses have been breached. It does not matter whether or not the modifications were bought by the firearm's registered owner; it matters that they were used in a crime, as in the case of #25-BT-0093 State of San Andreas v. Leo Devil.
  
  Additionally, when issuing the verdict on the charge of GF20 - Possession of Human Body Tissue, Judge Allgood stated "The Court notes there has been no evidence provided to suggest Diana Butler was not authorized to manage, store, or use the human tissue. Therefore, the Court cannot make any substantive conclusions here." The Prosecution correctly argued that this was unlawfully obtained human tissue, yet was, by the court's definition, unable to provide evidence against the potential permission for the defendant to be in its possession. However, the Prosecution was unable to present such evidence as it does not exist. The burden of proof lies with the Prosecution to prove that the defendant was not permitted to own the tissue, which was upheld by the lack of existence of permission; it is up to the Defense to argue that the defendant was within their right to be in possession, however they were unable to do so due to the lack of permission.
  
  Furthermore, related to DM04 - Possession of a Controlled Substance while Armed, Judge Allgood stated "The Defendant was only in possession of 7 marijuana plants. Possession of a controlled substance, specific to marijuana, is for the possession of more than 10 marijuana plants. Therefore, no evidence has been presented that the Defendant was in possession of a controlled substance in addition to being armed." While there is a distinction in the amount between receiving a citation for marijuana possession or the misdemeanor substance possession, there is no distinction when it comes to possession while armed. Whether or not the amount rises to the misdemeanor possession charge, Marijuana would be legally considered a controlled substance when considered in conjunction with firearms possession charges.

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The case of State of San Andreas v. Diana Butler is hereby activated by this Court under #25-AP-0000.

The appealing party is hereby ordered to submit an initial written brief within the next fourteen (14) days outlining their position of this appeal and giving any legal arguments as to why the court should rule to overturn a previous verdict. The fourteen (14) day timeline will begin when the LOA of the Attorney General has concluded on the 3rd of August, 2025. Once the initial brief has been recorded by the courts, the opposing counsel will be given an additional seven (7) days to respond. The initiating party will be given one final response, which the courts will allow sever (7) days to produce. The court may allow either party an additional response at the justices discretion. Once the briefs have been submitted the court will determine a verdict.


So ordered,

Branch Administrator
San Andreas Judicial Branch
505-9925 — [email protected]

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• Prosecution and defense counsel,
  
  This is a notice to all parties that the court will be in recess until all parties can provide a proper notice of counsel on the docket. Once both sides are represented, the case will move forward. We appreciate your patience during this time.
  
  Respectfully,
  
  
  Branch Administrator
  San Andreas Judicial Branch
  505-9925 — [email protected]

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I, Daniel Carmello, an Attorney with Carmello’s Consults, will be representing the Defendant(s), Diana Butler in the underlying case.

I will be taking the responsibility of Primary Counsel and will await further instruction from the Presiding Judge.

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• Parties,
  
  As we have representation from both sides, the court will now continue from the initial order made on the 27th day of July, 2025. The appealing party is hereby ordered to submit an initial written brief within the next fourteen (14) days outlining their position of this appeal and giving any legal arguments as to why the court should rule to overturn a previous verdict. If this order is completed prior to the fourteen (14) days timeline, the defense is invited to make their arguments without prompting from the court.
  
  Respectfully,
  
  
  Branch Administrator
  San Andreas Judicial Branch
  505-9925 — [email protected]

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  INITIAL BRIEF

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  The original trial for State of San Andreas v. Diana Butler rendered a verdict against the defendant, Diana Butler, charged with multiple serious and general felonies. Upon reviewing arguments from Prosecution and Defense counsel, the judge issued a series of verdicts resulting in multiple convictions against the defendant. However, the judge simultaneously issued several "Not Guilty" verdicts, which are now being appealed by the Prosecution, specifically:
  • WM03 - Criminal Use of Weapon Modifications
    GF20 - Possession of Human Body Tissue
    DM04 - Possession of a Controlled Substance while Armed
  The Prosecution will argue that the judge misapplied legal standards, improperly dismissed evidence, and ultimately rendered verdicts inconsistent with the totality of facts, testimony and arguments, and legal precedent, and files this brief with the intent to have the mentioned verdicts overturned and reinstated on the defendant's record.
  

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  The state's penal code provision for WM03 explicitly covers "use in the commission of a crime; modifications not legally purchaseable; or possession of modifications while charged with WM02 or other weapons felonies". In the verdict, the judge acknowledged that the defendant came into possession of a modified firearm, which was then used in the commission of several violent felonies. However, the judge asserted the charge should not be applicable as the defendant did not apply the modifications themselves; this is a flawed interpretation of the law. There is no distinction in the penal code requiring the defendant to have applied the modifications for the charge to apply; rather, they only have to be in possession of or use it during a crime for the charge to apply. Additionally, the modified firearm was used in the commission of several violent felonies, including the murder of a government employee. The felony context of the incident makes the modifications inherently criminal - at the moment the firearm was used or displayed in connection with these violent crimes, its modified status becomes relevant. While the firearm was stolen from its licensed carrier, the weapon was specifically stolen during the defendant's unlawful gathering and riot inside City Hall, and the added lethality of the weapon's modifications was then used against innocent civilians caught in the middle of the defendant's violent acts. Furthermore, the judge's statement on the so-called "legislative intent" behind the wording of WM03 is a narrow interpretation of the law and undermines any deterring effect of the law and the actual application of the law, as seen in #25-BT-0093 State of San Andreas v. Leo Devil, where the presiding judge accepted the defendant's guilty plea of WM03, when they had used their licensed and legally modified firearm when charged with a crime. Had a distinction been necessary, legislators would have been able to make it, as has been seen with other charges being amended through legislation. The Prosecution believes the legislative purpose behind criminalizing weapon modifications is to prevent enhanced lethality in the commission of a crime, no matter the source of the modification(s). In this case, whether the defendant attached the modifications themselves is immaterial to the case; the defendant utilized the benefit of those added modifications on the firearm during a violent criminal episode.
  
  The "Not Guilty" verdict issued for GF20 is similarly based on flawed logic, the verdict relying solely on the fact that there was "no evidence suggesting the defendant was not authorized to manage, store, or use the human tissue in their possession". However, the Prosecution was unable to provide such evidence as it does not exist, as there are no governmental records authorizing such actions by the defendant, which was stated in court by the Prosecution during arguments, directly contradicting the judge's verdict on the charge. A bill clarifying the authorization required for human tissue possession was signed into law some months ago, amending the charge to only allow government employees and city-contracted coroners to possess and/or transport the tissue. While this bill was approved and signed into law after the incident involving the defendant, and not having been explicitly stated in the penal code previously, the same disposition has been applied prior to the signing of the bill, i.e., that you would have to be a government employee to be considered authorized for possession. Nevertheless, the Prosecution presented and argued the lack of evidence in court, and the judge's dismissal of the facts presented at trial is perceived as blatant bias against the Prosecution and in favor of the defendant.
  
  As with WM03 and GF20, the verdict of "Not Guilty" regarding DM04 is another flawed interpretation of the law. The judge reasons that because the amount of Marijuana found on the defendant fell below the upper limit of what is permissible under GC06 - Possession of Cannabis, the specific amount documented in the evidence was not enough to qualify it as a "controlled substance". However, the penal code itself is proof that any amount of Marijuana, plants, or seeds is a controlled substance, as is evident by the fact it contains a general citation that regulates and controls the amount of Marijuana any one individual can be in possession of before it rises to a misdemeanor. Furthermore, there is no distinction for the amount necessary for DM04 to be applicable, only that it requires a "controlled substance". Marijuana, as well as its lesser offshoots, is an inherently controlled substance as evidenced by the penal code itself, with the only distinction in the code being whether or not the amount rises for it to become a "scheduled" substance.
  
  
  
  Terence Williams
  Attorney General
  San Andreas Judicial Branch
  234-9321 — [email protected]

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• Prosecution and defense counsel,
  
  Prosecution, thank you for posting your initial brief. Defense, you must present your response to the courts within fourteen (14) days or file a Motion for Continuance. If the defense submits their written response prior to the fourteen (14) days, the prosecution may immediately respond without prompting.
  
  Respectfully,
  
  
  Branch Administrator
  San Andreas Judicial Branch
  505-9925 — [email protected]

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The Defendant, by and through the undersigned attorney, filed this Motion for Continuance, and the reasoning for request is as follows;

• Reasoning: Counsel unavailable
  • Detailed Explanation: The defense counsel has been very busy recently and has been unable to respond. With this being said, the defense requests an additional seven (7) days to put together our case. ((I have been going through IRL issues and have not been able to be on my computer.))

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• Prosecution and defense counsel,
  
  The Court of Appeals will be officially accepting the Motion for Continuance. Given the small amount of time and lack of objection from the Prosecution, the court will give defense seven (7) days to respond. To the court, this means we will be expecting a response from the defense counsel by the end of the 8th day of December, 2025.
  
  Respectfully,
  
  
  Branch Administrator
  San Andreas Judicial Branch
  505-9925 — [email protected]

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• Prosecution and defense counsel,
  
  The defense has provided their response in the given time limit. That being said, this case now moves to the responsibility of the prosecution. Prosecution, if you so choose, you may post a rebuttal to the defenses response. You have seven (7) days and then the Court of Appeals will begin the deliberation process.
  
  Respectfully,
  
  
  Branch Administrator
  San Andreas Judicial Branch
  505-9925 — [email protected]

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The State of San Andreas, by and through the undersigned attorney, filed this Motion for Continuance, and the reasoning for the request is as follows;

• Reasoning: Unavailability
  • Detailed Explanation: Due to private health concerns, the Prosecution is unable to dedicate the remaining time to work and to finalise the arguments' brief within the appropriate deadline. The Prosecution asks for an additional three (3) days to be able to finalise the response to the Defense's arguments.
    ((Very late-stage complications after a medical procedure last week are taking an unexpected toll on me.))

Terence Williams
Attorney General
San Andreas Judicial Branch
234-9321 — [email protected]

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• FINAL BRIEF

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  Regarding WM03 - Criminal Use of Weapon Modifications, the Defense argues that the defendant's alleged lack of knowledge regarding the weapon modifications applied to the weapon, which was stolen and used by the defendant, should negate culpability. This argument improperly narrows the scope of the charge, asserting that culpability is only possible if there is knowledge or personal application of the modification(s) to the weapon. The penal code definition specifically criminalises 'possession' of any type of modification applicable to a firearm when that modification is either used in a crime or in possession when charged with misdemeanor firearms possession, as well - both of these points apply to the defendant's actions. Constructive knowledge and responsibility attach when an individual knowingly possesses or uses a firearm, which is particularly true in high-risk or criminal contexts. As was documented by the physical evidence attached to the arrest report, the firearm stolen and used by the defendant was modified to such a degree that it is not even close to plausible that the defendant did not notice a side-mounted flashlight, top-mounted sight, extended magazine in the handle, and a compensator elongating the firearm.
  
  Additionally, while legislative intent may be considered, it should not override the plan language of the charge's written definition. There is no ambiguity present in the definition, and no paragraphs available for misinterpretation by lawmakers, defendants, and judges alike. Accepting the argument that a modification would have to be personally attached and with ill intent, i.e., for criminal use, not only sets a dangerous precedent for criminals to claim innocence by ignorance, it also directly undermines public safety and the specific legislative purpose of the written charge.
  
  
  For GF20 - Possession of Human Body Tissue, the Defense's argument relies solely on the fact that no analytical evidence was provided to establish the nature of the tissue found in the defendant's possession, despite presenting the court with no alternative explanations of its origins supported by evidence. Oftentimes, evidence is observed and analysed in the field by the state's trained law enforcement officers, who then determine the status of various types of evidence and contraband. Similar to how officers are trained in differentiating between various types of controlled substances, they are also trained in the analysis of various tissues and how to distinguish them, both in the field and via hematology. Just as officers can distinguish a Schedule I substance from a Schedule II substance, so were they able to distinguish this tissue as human, as opposed to tissue from an animal. The court has routinely accepted credible observations and officer testimony as proof beyond a reasonable doubt when compared to an unexplained and unlawful possession such as the defendant's, and it should do so too in this matter.
  
  Further, as was argued by the Prosecution at trial, no evidence exists that the defendant was "authorized by a government institution licensed to manage, storing and/or using human tissue"; they have no employment record or notice with any government institution to allow them for such possession, and they have a history of felony tissue possession as evidence by their record presented in court.
  
  
  Marijuana, whichever amount an individual may possess, is a controlled substance; the Defense's reliance on an amount threshold is misplaced. The penal code is a testament to that. It is inconsequential whether it is a citation or a criminal misdemeanor - the fact that a penal code regulates it solidifies its status as a controlled substance. The charge also does not consider quantity, but only the dangerous and lethal combination of narcotics possession and firearms possession; while variances in quantity can be the difference between it being a citation for possessing cannabis or possession of a Schedule III substance, the charge criminalises any type and amount of controlled substance possession while armed. The totality of the evidence that was presented at trial by the Prosecution satisfies the legislative concern underlying DM04 - Possession of a Controlled Substance while Armed.
  
  Equally, just as with the lack of any state authorization for possessing human tissue, no evidence of a valid prescription was presented by either side at trial because it does not exist. The absence of such evidence is proof that the possession was unlawful. The Defendant was armed and in possession of marijuana plants, and more, without a valid prescription. These facts alone satisfy the statutory elements of DM04.
  
  
  Lastly, the Prosecution will not comment on the charge of SF02 - Murder of a Government Employee, as it is outside the scope of this appeal and should not be considered. However, should the presiding decide to allow it, the Prosecution would like to reserve its right to issue a final comment in turn.
  
  
  The Defense has argued issues of intent, evidentiary standards, and statutory interpretation. It is the position of the Prosecution that the totality of the evidence provided at the original trial and applicable law supports the original charges brought against the defendant, as has been argued in this brief.
  

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  Terence Williams
  Attorney General
  San Andreas Judicial Branch
  234-9321 — [email protected]

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The court will review each charge individually beginning with WM03 – Criminal Use of Weapon Modifications, moving on to GF20 – Possession of Human Body Tissue, and DM04 – Possession of a Controlled Substance while Armed. The Superior Court ruled in their verdict on the 21st day of June, 2025.

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The Prosecution argued that WM03 criminalizes possession or use of weapon modifications when they are used in the commission of a crime or when the defendant is charged with a weapons felony. The Prosecution maintained that possession and use alone satisfy the statute, and that the Superior Court erred by creating extra elements not present in the law.

The defense argues that the Defendant did not know the firearm was modified and did not apply or purchase the modifications. They stated that the modifications were legally obtained by the firearm’s registered owner. They backed the Superior Court Judges ruling, detailing that WM03 should target individuals who intentionally modify weapons for criminal use, not those who “stumble into” a modified firearm.

The Superior court acknowledged the legislation stated that it applies when used in the commission of a crime, not legally purchasable, or in possession while charged with a weapons felony. The main factor behind the decision of the Superior Court Judge was that the defense "claims that she was handed a weapon which had been stolen from someone inside City Hall" and that "the legislative intent was to cover person(s) who obtain these modifications for use in a crime, not merely stumbling into a weapon with them on it". The Superior Court grounded its ruling in an interpretation of legislative intent, expressing concern that WM03 was designed to target individuals who obtain weapon modifications for criminal use, rather than those who come into incidental possession of a modified firearm.

While legislative intent may be considered where statutory language is ambiguous, it cannot override or narrow the plain language of an unambiguous statute. Meaning, that when a law is vague, intent can be a factor in the verdict, but in laws where the language is specific, a judge cannot apply intent. WM03 explicitly applies when weapon modifications are ‘used in the commission of a crime’ or are in the defendant’s possession during a weapons felony or more accurately for this case, WM02 - Possession of a Class 1 Firearm, as that is a charge the court found the defendant guilty of at trial.

The Court of Appeals notes, the penal code definition does not assign fault to who initially installed, how it was obtained, or the defendant’s subjective intent when considering the modification itself. However, the Court recognizes the concern that criminal liability should not be imposed absent culpable conduct. Culpable conduct, for purposes of criminal liability, consists of the acts or conditions the legislature has defined as sufficient to trigger responsibility, not additional requirements imposed by judicial interpretation. In other words, a person is responsible when they meet the legal definition of the offense, not only when they meet additional conditions that are not written into the law. However, under WM03, the culpable conduct is not the acquisition of the modification, but the use or possession of a modified weapon in connection with criminal activity.

Notably, the Superior Court found that the modified firearm was used during the commission of the charged offenses, as well as found the defendant guilty of WM02 - Possession of a Class 1 Firearm. These facts satisfy the statutory condition for ‘criminal use’ under WM03, which specifically lists that to qualify for the charge, the given modifications should be:

1. Used in the commission of a crime
2. Not eligible to be purchased through legal retailers in the State
3. If modifications are in their possession at the time one receives "WM02 - Possession of a Class 1 Firearm" or any Weapons Felony as defined by the penal code as "WFXX"

Accordingly, while the Superior Court’s concern is understandable, its reliance on perceived legislative intent improperly narrowed the scope of WM03 and constitutes a legal error.

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Moving on to GF20 – Possession of Human Body Tissue, and starting with the argument from the prosecution that GF20 makes possession of human body tissue illegal unless authorized by a licensed government institution. The Defense argues because the meat was never scientifically tested that the prosecution failed to even prove that the meat was of human origin. Both sides agree no evidence was presented that the defendant had authorization nor was it provided that the defendant did not have authorization to posses human tissue.

In their verdict, the Superior Court highlighted that "there has been no evidence provided to suggest Diana Butler was not authorized to manage, store, or use the human tissue. Therefore, the Court cannot make any substantive conclusions here." The Court of Appeals notes two important factors that the Superior Court did not find: the tissue was not human and the defendant was authorized. Instead, it declined to rule because evidence of non-authorization was not presented.

The Court of Appeals finds that authorization is an affirmative condition in the courts. An affirmative condition is a specific requirement that must be met to make otherwise illegal conduct lawful, and the responsibility to show that the condition is met rests with the person claiming it. In mathematical terms, if the law says “you cannot do X unless Y,” then Y is an affirmative condition. The Court of Appeals finds the Superior Court misapplied the burden of proof and required the Prosecution to disprove authorization, rather than asking the individual to provide proof of authorization.

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Lastly, the Court of Appeals will review DM04 – Possession of a Controlled Substance while Armed. The Prosecution argued that DM04 applies to the possession of any controlled substance while armed, that marijuana is explicitly classified as a Schedule III controlled substance under DM03, and that DM04 contains no quantity threshold. The Defense argued that the defendant was only in possession of 7 marijuana, and that the low quantity falls under GC06, and not DM03. They stated that since the possession did not rise to a misdemeanor drug offense, it should not satisfy DM04.

The Superior Court agrees with the presented argument from the defense in their verdict. They state "The Defendant was only in possession of 7 marijuana plants. Possession of a controlled substance, specific to marijuana, is for the possession of more than 10 marijuana plants. Therefore, no evidence has been presented that the Defendant was in possession of a controlled substance in addition to being armed.”

To review each of the laws referenced by the Superior Court in order to obtain their verdict, the Court of Appeals must make the distinction between a definitional statue and a charging statue. A definitional statute establishes classifications or meanings that apply across the legal code, such as what qualifies as a controlled substance. DM03 would be the definitional statue as it answers WHAT cannabis is in the eyes of the law, specifically qualifying it as a controlled substance and making possession of it illegal (possession statue). A charging statute determines the level of offense, citation, or penalty based on specific facts, such as quantity, context, or severity. Keeping that in mind, the Court of Appeals notes that GC06 is considered to be a charging statue, as it answers HOW cannabis possession is charged when it is the only offense.

Finally, DM04 is considered by the Court of Appeals to be an enhancement statute. An enhancement statute is a law that increases criminal responsibility or penalties when certain risky or aggravating conditions are present, even if the underlying conduct might otherwise be minor. In the terms of this case, it increases the seriousness of a charge when extra risk factors are present, such as combining drugs with firearms.

The law of DM04 is defined as "possessing any controlled substance, without a valid medical prescription or medical license, whilst armed with any type of firearm". The Court of Appeals notes the law does not reference quantity of the controlled substance, cross-reference GC06, or require the substance to qualify as a misdemeanor-level offense. What the law does do is focus on the risk created by armed possession (enhancement statue), not the severity of the drug offense (charging statue). In their verdict the Superior Court did not find that the marijuana was not present and that the defendant was not armed. Based on the classification of statues and the letter of the law, the Court of Appeals finds that the Superior Court misapplied DM04.

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It is with the above considerations that the Court of Appeals moves to reverse the original ruling by the judge:

• On the count of WM03 - Criminal Use of Weapon Modifications, I find the defendant, Diana Butler, guilty.
• On the count of DM04 - Possession of a Controlled Substance while Armed, I find the defendant, Diana Butler, guilty.
• On the count of GF20 - Possession of Human Body Tissue, I find the defendant, Diana Butler, guilty.

While the Court of Appeals is reversing the decision of the original judge, we will not be fining the defendant or requiring they spend additional time in jail.

So ordered,


Branch Administrator
San Andreas Judicial Branch
505-9925 — [email protected]