
Appellant Name: Prosecution Division of the State of San Andreas
Appellant Attorney(s):
Appellant Attorney(s):
Trial Docket Number: #24-CM-0055, State of San Andreas v. Cyrus Raven
Presiding Trial Judge: Antonio McFornell
Notice of Appeal Filed:
Presiding Trial Judge: Antonio McFornell
Notice of Appeal Filed:
- [ ] Before Verdict
[X] After Verdict
Reason for Notice of Appeal:
- [ ] Motion to be overturned
[ ] Errors in the trials procedure
[X] Errors in the judge's interpretation of the law
[ ] New evidence proving appellants innocence
- Introduction:
The prosecution would like to present multiple sides to our argument. First we'd like to discuss the verdict provided by the Justice on the case, second we'd like to evaluate the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense, third we'll discuss the purpose of checkpoints in terms of operations and benefits, and finally we'll review the request of identification at traffic stops.
Justice McFornell's Verdict:
The prosecution would like to touch on several key points stated within the verdict of Justice McFornell. To quote, "the Court believes that checkpoints of these nature serve purposes that are well within constitutional and legal bounds. The Court, in that regard, had no reason to believe the ordained checkpoint lacked legality." The Justice at this point has established precedence to state that checkpoints are legal.
To quantify checkpoints as legal would mean that the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) would be afforded the same sort of legality. The prosecution will review the SOP of Law Enforcement Officers (LEOs), but at the moment we'd like to focus on another quote from the Justice, "the Court believes that the orders given by police officers within the context of Checkpoints are naturally presumed lawful or of a legal nature. It would be unreasonable to not provide at least a basic presumption of legality or lawfulness to the orders or indications provided by police officers." Once again the Justice has seemingly given further legality and precedence to the orders given by LEOs during these checkpoints.
The prosecution has no issues with anything the Justice states, nor do we disagree with him. Until he states "the Prosecution only proved that Cyrus Raven entered a checkpoint and was immediately required to identify. At no point, no circumstances allowed the initiation of an investigation -or at least, no mention of such circumstance was brought up-. The Court believes that DUI checkpoints can provide ample opportunity and circumstances for law enforcement agencies to justify an investigation, however, that was not the case on the situation at hand." The issue with the verdict from the Justice is that he assumed the nature of the checkpoint, when that was not stated anywhere in evidence.
Evaluation of Evidence:
The Justice specifically referred to the checkpoint as a DUI checkpoint. In no evidence provided to the courts was this stated. What was stated on the arrest report was, "While operating a Highway Enforcement Division (HED) Checkpoint, Cyrus Raven pulled up to the second gate, and refused to present Identification, we gave him many chances and he refused to do so, he eventually asked for a Supervisor, which ultimately resulted in his arrest for Failure to Comply." The arrest report proves that this was not simply a DUI checkpoint, but a HED checkpoint.
SOP of Checkpoints:
When HED conducts a checkpoint or any other Highway Law Enforcement operation, the goals are the following:
- To do basic vehicle ownership, legality, and insurance checks.
- To enforce speed limits via the means of speed measurement equipment.
- To prevent traffic crime by presence in areas of interest.
- To conduct DUI routine checks with the assistant of special equipment and K9.
- To inspect vehicles as per their worthiness to operate and whether they are safe to operate. Prevent the use of hazardous vehicles.
- To educate drivers on the best practices of road behavior.
- To conduct other types of investigation or road security with or without the help of other departments or LSSD divisions as authorized by the directorate of Patrol Operations.
The prosecution would like to review the legality behind requesting a license from an individual during a checkpoint. We argue that the investigation begins the moment a checkpoint is set up as the purpose of the checkpoint is to educate, enforce speed limits, conduct DUI routine checks, inspect vehicles, etc. Part of this investigation is checking the license of the individual to ensure that the paperwork for the vehicle matches properly.
Conclusion:
As stated by Assistant Sheriff Balakay, "I informed Mr. Raven that we have the ability to check his license in this case to ensure that he is valid, and then he would be free on his way." The Justice himself agreed to the legality of checkpoints and requests from officers at checkpoints, to review, "the Court believes that the orders given by police officers within the context of Checkpoints are naturally presumed lawful or of a legal nature". The Justice mistakenly qualified the checkpoint as a DUI and failed to take into account the general investigative nature of a checkpoint. It's entire purpose is to conduct investigations on drivers that enter and drive on the specific roadway.
LEOs attempted to inform the defendant that they were checking to see if he had a valid license. While they do not have to provide a reasoning to an individual when conducting an investigation, LSSD still made the defendant aware. He refused to comply with multiple orders. LSSD provided a supervisor for the defendant. The defendant still refused to comply.
The prosecution would like to end with the question: if (i) orders given by police officers within the context of Checkpoints are naturally presumed lawful or of a legal nature and (ii) checkpoints themselves are lawful, then how is the request for identification ruled unlawful? After a review of the SOP during checkpoints, the verdict of the Justice simply seems contradictory.





